1
When the CFAA was introduced in the early 1980s, the federal government was using approximately 18,000 computers. 2 In contrast, in March 2014, the Washington Post estimated that the federal government now uses more than 4 million computers. 3 The difference in the number of computers alone shows the reliance on both the machines and the data those machines make possible.
The CFAA both criminalizes certain behaviors and makes people civilly liable for "exceeding authorized access" of a computer. 4 The issue came to Congress' attention in the early 1980s when a group of Milwaukee teenagers, known as the 414 Gang (after their area code), were able to hack into a cancer treatment center. 5 The teenagers gained access to records of some 6,000 cancer patients and even had the ability to change radiation treatment levels. 6 The incident took a small financial toll on the center, but the life-threatening nature of the hack caused the Senate Committee on the Judiciary concern and led to the modern-day language of the CFAA. 7 The CFAA can be used to criminally prosecute someone or can be used in a civil lawsuit. 8 The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits claim that the CFAA is much too vague to successfully prosecute or sue under, except in very limited circumstances. 9 Courts and scholars named this the "narrow" interpretation because these courts utilize a more literal interpretation of the CFAA language. 10 In contrast, the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use a "broad" interpretation of the CFAA by construing the language as an intended-use analysis, making prosecution and lawsuits more judicially feasible.
11
This means that the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, interpret improper use of data as actually exceeding authorized access. 12 This Comment will analyze the purpose of the CFAA by quickly dissecting the House of Representatives' and the Senate's approach to the law in Part II. Then, this Comment will examine the circuit split, teasing out the two different interpretations of the law and how those interpretations create either a prosecution-friendly or plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction versus a defendant-friendly jurisdiction. Next, in Part III, this Comment will analyze the differing viewpoints of the varying interpretations. Part IV will suggest two options for how to handle the circuit split: an analysis of the current language and an explanation as to why the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari, and in doing so, why the Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of 5 Will Storr, The kid hackers who starred in a real-life WarGames, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 16, 2015) , http://www.telegraph.co.uk/film/the-414s/hackers-wargames-true-story/. See infra Section II.C. See also § 1030. Specifically, the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits operate under the assumption that improper data use is not exceeding authorized access if the person did in fact have authorized access to the computer. 
See infra Section II.D.
12
See infra Section II.D. See also Hossain, 103 F.Supp.3d at 871. This "broad" interpretation is based on an intended-use analysis, meaning employees or competitors can be prosecuted for using data in a manner not intended by the original source. the law. Alternatively, Part IV will put forth an argument that the CFAA should be repealed and replaced with two different statutes: one for criminal culpability with a separate section for offenders who are government operatives, and another concerning civil liability. This ambiguity, along with the evolving nature of hacking and the need to comprehensively cover employees' behavior, resulted in the language's change. 16 The switch caused a rift among the circuit courts in interpreting the Act.
II

17
For the past thirty years, federal courts battled with the language of "exceeds authorized access," dividing themselves into two distinct camps.
18
A. How Do You Use This Thing? Congressional Action on Computer Security
In 1983, the House of Representatives introduced a bill that would eventually become the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. 
20
The House Committee on the Judiciary found white-collar crimes were neglected on both a federal and a state level.
21
At the time, the only statutes remotely dealing with cybersecurity were mail fraud or wire fraud. Id. at 6. Even if mail fraud or wire fraud would cover the alleged conduct, because there was no specific framework of how to go about charging someone for a computerrelated crime these cases were treated as an "untested basis for prosecution."
The Senate also expressed concerns over the rise of hackers.
23
After passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Congress continued to investigate potential computer crimes and possible statutory solutions. 24 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary cited the 414 Gang incident as a serious concern over the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.
25
After the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the Justice Department criticized the scope of the act as being too narrow because the original version only protected a particular set of financial and credit information.
26
The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Computer Crime suggested the Comprehensive Crime Control Act needed to define terms such as "access," "authorization," "affects," and "use."
27
The Task Force also noted that while the terms used in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act would cover hackers, the terms were still too vague when dealing with employees.
28
While Congress wanted to protect employees who were using data appropriately, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act provided almost no guidance on how to handle the idea that employees could have access to data and still "access without authorization," as the original language stated.
29
The Task Force also wanted the Federal Bureau of Investigations to have primary investigative jurisdiction because, at the time, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act mainly covered government computers. 30 Finally, the task force wanted a civil remedies option because the Comprehensive Crime Control Act did not have one.
31
In 1986, the CFAA, as it is known today, passed with changes to definitions, the scope of the Act, and an attempt to fix some of the ambiguous language. Id.at 470. 28 Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 471. 31 Id.
32
Griffith, supra note 15, at 474.
Practitioners dealing with the CFAA would not know these "categories" as the Department of Justice has named them, but, for clarity's sake, this comment will refer to cases by their category to give a firm example of how the CFAA arises and how it is interpreted. 37 First, when a person is prohibited from accessing the information expressly; second, when a person has authorized access to the information and is expressly forbidden from using the information in certain ways, but the access of the information is not conditioned on obeying the restrictions; and third, when a person has not been commanded to avoid certain uses of the information but does so against the authorizing party's best interest.
38
To better understand these three areas, consider the following: an employee enters information into a database for work. If the employee were to then access another program from another department, this would be an example of the first situation.
39
She was not given authorization and then gained access anyway. For the second category, suppose a person builds a program that will track the changes to a website and compiles that information into a spreadsheet. 40 Even though the website expressly prohibits people from doing this, the website did not condition the person's access of the information on not using the information in a certain way. 41 Finally, if an employee was given access to a certain database, and told to not research personal interests in the database (say a neighbor's billing 33 Id. 18. U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(6) (West 1986). 36 Eltringham, supra, at 9-10. 37 Id. at 10. 38 Id. at 9.
See generally id. 40 
Id.
41
See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 2001). statement,) but does so anyway, this is an example of the third category of cases.
42
The third category of cases is more controversial because the courts struggle with the narrow and broad interpretation of the CFAA regarding employee's access. A vast majority of cases used in this Comment will be from that third category.
43
C. Right Click: Narrow Interpretations
In May of 2012, New York City police officer Gilberto Valle logged onto the Omnixx Force Mobile and searched for a woman he knew for years. 44 The program allows officers access to restricted databases, which include private information, such as home addresses and birthdates, as well as the federal National Crime Information Center database. A jury found Valle guilty of violating the CFAA, but the Second Circuit reversed this decision, calling the conviction "highly problematic" because, while Valle was authorized to access the information, he was using the information for unauthorized purposes. 49 The Second Circuit held the court should construe the statute narrowly so as not to "unintentionally turn ordinary citizens into criminals."
50
The Second Circuit also hinted a broad construction could turn seemingly innocent behavior, like checking one's Facebook at work, into a punishable offense.
51
While Valle's case may seem like an extreme use of the CFAA, other circuits have also found interpreting the language to be difficult and have followed the same narrow approach as the Second Circuit. 42 
Id.
43
See supra Part II.C-D. Valle, 807 F.3d at 512. 47 Id.
48
49
Id. at 523. In opening statements, Valle's attorney argued he did not violate the CFAA because, while Valle did violate the terms of his employment conducting the search, he did not "obtain any information he was not entitled to obtain.". 50 Id. at 527. 51 
Id.
The Fourth Circuit wrestled with interpreting the CFAA in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions v. Miller. 52 In that case, the defendant, Mike Miller, and his assistant downloaded files from WEC Carolina Energy Solutions ("WEC") and then used those files at a new company to poach a potential client from WEC.
53
The Fourth Circuit held that while Miller may have misappropriated the information, he did not exceed his authorized access. 54 The court reached this conclusion by relying on WEC's complaint, which stated Miller had access to intranet, WEC servers, and confidential information. 55 In conceding these points, WEC essentially stated Miller had authorized access to confidential information, which led to the dismissal of the claim.
56
The Ninth Circuit used the narrow approach with its opinion in United States v. Nosal I.
57
In Nosal I, an employee, David Nosal, convinced his coworkers to download confidential source lists for an executive search firm.
58
Nosal then left the company and started a competing business.
59
All of the employees at the firm were aware of the company's explicit policy forbidding use of the company's confidential information.
60
Nosal was charged with aiding and abetting his former coworkers to exceed their authorized access.
61
The count was dismissed by the district court after a motion for reconsideration.
62
The court reasoned " [t] here is simply no way" the definition of "exceeds authorized access" was meant to include company policies.
63
The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that the government's argument would make the CFAA too broad.
64
The court also agreed with Nosal, maintaining that the CFAA was only ever intended to be an anti-hacking 52 687 F.3d 199, 200 (4th Cir. 2012). WEC filed suit against Miller, claiming Miller had violated the CFAA and exceeded his authorized use of the data from the files. 53 Id. 54 Id. at 207.
55
56
Id. The court used a narrow approach, which concluded an employee exceeds authorized access by gaining access to information outside of his approved access; see also Id. at 204. This meant that the court did not find an employee exceeded authorized access when they improperly used such data. Nosal 676 F.3d at 856. 59 Id.
60
61
62
63
64
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857. statute. 65 The court advocated that a broad interpretation would "make criminals of large groups of people who would have little reason to suspect they are committing a federal crime." 66 The court argued a broad construction of the CFAA would make seemingly innocent activities such as instant messenger chatting or checking social media punishable simply because those activities may be against company-wide computer-use policies. 67 Further, this could allow companies to improperly fire employees because the company could threaten the employee with FBI interference for misuse of company computers. 68 Thus, a broad construction could "invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" because the employer-employee relationship would evolve from one governed by tort and contract law to one governed by criminal law. 
D. Left Click: Broad Interpretations
In contrast, while the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have generally held the Act's language should be read narrowly, the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a plain-language reading. 71 Instead, these four circuits use more of a reasonable-expectations test when describing acceptable behavior under the CFAA. This test, best described by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Phillips and United States v. John, says that when a person exceeds the reasonable expectations of the intended-use of the data, the person has violated the CFAA.
72
To better explain this, the first major case that depicted a broader interpretation of the CFAA and how it could affect data use comes from 65 Id. at 858. 66 Id. at 859. 67 Id. at 860. 68 Id.
69
Id. In a subsequent proceeding regarding the prosecution of Nosal for conspiring with his former coworkers to violate company policy, the Ninth Circuit vacated in part and remanded the case to the district court because Nosal had by the "ordinary meaning" of "without authorization" violated the CFAA. Id. at 869. The Ninth Circuit still maintained that Nosal I was correctly decided because authorization was not an issue, as the coworkers had authorization from the company despite the fact that they had clearly and admittedly violated company policy. Id. at 874. The court reasoned that because Nosal instructed his coworkers to break that company policy, he satisfied the necessary element of intent and thus was a conspirator for violating the "without authorization" portion of the CFAA. Id. at 880. Explorica, a company founded in 2000, arranged global trips for students. 74 The company was a direct competitor to EF, which was the largest privatelyowned teen travel company in the world. 75 Employees from EF left to join Explorica and sought to undercut EF's prices to take over the student travel market. 76 Part of Explorica's strategy was to build a "scraper" that would extensively search EF's website for pricing on tour codes. 77 Explorica then used the information to undercut EF's prices. 78 After finding out about the scraper during a separate lawsuit, EF was granted an injunction against Explorica from using the scraper, and filed a lawsuit claiming Explorica violated the CFAA. 79 The First Circuit, in rendering its decision, did not decide whether the use of a scraper would satisfy the CFAA's language of "exceeds authorized use." 80 Instead, the court found that because there was a broad confidentiality agreement between the employee involved in this lawsuit and EF, the employee exceeded authorized use when he contributed to the development of the scraper and the subsequent use of the scraper on EF's website. 81 This broad interpretation was better defined in United States v. Phillips, a case involving Christopher Andrew Phillips, a freshman at the University of Texas.
82
Phillips signed a computer-use policy upon matriculation, but shortly after starting school, Phillips began to steal data, including passwords. 
74
Id. 75 Id. at 579. 76 Id. 77 Id. Scrapers are used on the Internet for search engines to filter content and find information. Id. The difference with Explorica's scraper is that the scraper only targeted EF's website, recording more than 30,000 inquiries and price information and then tunneling that information into a comprehensive spreadsheet for Explorica. Id. Explorica used the scraper twice, amassing 60,000 lines of data, which is equal to around eight telephone directories. Id. at 580. 78 Id. at 579 79 Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d at 580. The court found that, because the employee instructed a tech company how to decipher EF's website and find the tour codes, the employee had exceeded the authorized use of EF's website. Id. at 583. The employee attempted to argue that all of the information was available on EF's website; however, the court found the employee exceeded his authorized used because of the language of a contract he signed: "which might reasonably be construed to be contrary to the interests of EF." Id.
80
Id. at 581. records, and Social Security numbers. 84 Despite warnings, Phillips used a "'brute-force attack' program" to steal up to six Social Security numbers per second."
85
A jury convicted Phillips under the CFAA, and he received five years' probation, five-hundred community service hours, and restitution in the amount of $170,056, which he subsequently appealed.
86
The Fifth Circuit used an intended-use test to determine if Phillips violated the CFAA when he used the university's computer system to gather data. 87 In doing so, the court stated that the CFAA should be read broadly to determine whether or not the access exceeded authorization. 88 To
89
The Fifth Circuit further clarified the aforementioned analysis in United States v. John.
90
In that case, the defendant, Dimetriace Eva-Lavon John, was an account manager at Citigroup.
91
Through her position, John had access to customer account information.
92
John gave her half-brother printouts of screenshots of customer information and eventually gathered the confidential information of at least seventy-six corporate customers.
93
John's half-brother used that information to incur fraudulent charges against four of those corporate customers.
94
John tried to argue that she did not violate the CFAA when she accessed the customer's data because she was authorized to use Citigroup's computers and accessing that data was a part of her job.
95
The First Circuit again used the intended-use analysis to reason that what John did was in fact a violation of the CFAA: To give but one example, an employer may "authorize" employees to 84 Id. 85 Id. at 218. The attack cost the university close to $200,000 to assess the damage and notify victims. Id. It was estimated over the fourteen-month attack that Phillips gained access to 45,000 people's information, but claimed he never intended to use or sell the information. Id.
86
Id. at 218-19. 87 Id. at 219. Phillips attempted to argue that because the university's website was a public application, he was an authorized user. Id. at 220. In making their decision, the court reasoned that, while anyone could type the URL for the university's website into the search bar, the university had to grant access for individual users and that created a contractual relationship that Phillips violated. Id.
88
Phillips, 477 F.3d at 219. 89 Id. at 219-220. Id. at 269. 92 Id.
93
94
95
Id. at 271. In a parsing of the statute, John argued the CFAA does not cover the actual use of the information but instead only covers accessing, obtaining, or altering data she was not authorized to obtain. Id.
utilize computers for any lawful purpose but not for unlawful purposes and only in furtherance of the employer's business. An employee would "exceed [ ] authorized access" if he or she used that access to obtain or steal information as part of a criminal scheme. 96 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because she was authorized to access the information for limited purposes only and understood that as a part of her job description, John thus exceeded authorized access when she used the information outside of the scope of her employment. 97 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit furthered the implications of the intended-use analysis by finding that merely accessing the information would violate the CFAA. 98 In United States v. Rodriguez, Roberto Rodriguez worked for the Social Security Administration and had access to Social Security numbers, addresses, birthdates, and other information due to the nature of his job.
99
Rodriguez refused to sign acknowledgment forms about policies regarding the databases.
100
It was through this monitoring that the Administration flagged Rodriguez's access and told Rodriguez that the Administration was conducting a criminal investigation.
101
Rodriguez claimed he was conducting a whistleblowing expedition to see if the Administration would notice his unauthorized use.
102
Rodriguez was sentenced to one year in prison and one year of supervised release.
103
Rodriguez relied upon United States v. John, saying that only the use of the information would be a crime; the court, however, corrected Rodriguez, finding that because he conceded he had exceeded his authorized use, it did not matter what purpose Rodriguez had for the information.
104
The court also noted that it did not matter that Rodriguez did not use the information to defraud or for financial gain. Id. at 1260. On numerous occasions, Rodriguez accessed information of former girlfriends, family members, and random strangers, going as far as to use the information to wish someone a "happy half-birthday." Id. at 1261. 100 Id. The Social Security Administration asserted that to make sure employees were following the policies, it gave individualized identification numbers and passwords and monitored the employee's access and compliance with policy. Id.
101
Id. at 1260. 102 Id. at 1262. 103 Id.
104
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263. 105 Id.
106
Id.
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Eject the Floppy Disk 3 1
E. Force Quit: The Call for Reform
In 2010, Aaron Swartz, a co-founder of the popular website Reddit, was indicted for "attempting to download all of the electronically archived materials maintained by JSTOR while accessing them through a computer network operated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT")." 107 Swartz allegedly downloaded millions of articles from JSTOR, a digital library boasting more than 2,300 academic journals and historical information, and then released the documents so that anyone could read and interpret them. The law would amend the CFAA to strike the phrase "exceeds authorized access" and instead replace it with the phrase "access without authorization." 113 The amended CFAA would define "access without authorization" as: "(A) to obtain information on a protected computer; (B) that the accesser lacks authorization to obtain; and (C) by knowingly circumventing one or more technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining that information." A person commits an offense if, with the intent to defraud or harm another or alter, damage, or delete property, the person knowingly accesses: (1) a computer, computer network, or computer system without the effective consent of the owner; or (2) a computer, computer network, or computer system: (A) that is owned by: (i) the government; or (ii) a business or other commercial entity engaged in a business activity; (B) in violation of: (i) a clear and conspicuous prohibition by the owner of the computer, computer network, or computer system; or (ii) a contractual agreement to which the person has expressly agreed; and (C) with the intent to obtain or use a file, data, or proprietary information stored in the computer, network, or system to defraud or harm another or alter, damage, or delete property.
125
There are only two defenses within the Texas Penal Code § 33.02: legitimate law enforcement purposes and when someone contracts to provide computer security. West 1985) . The statute also defines the terms computer, computer network, computer program, or computer system. Ann. § 33.01(4)(5)(6)(8) . Computer is defined as "an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high-speed data processing device that performs logical, arithmetic, or memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses and includes all input, output, processing, storage, or communication facilities that are connected or related to the device." Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.01 (4) (West 1985). Computer network is "the interconnection of two or more computers or computer systems by satellite, microwave, line, or other communication medium with the capability to transmit information among the computers." Id.; Ann. § 33.01 (5) . A computer program is defined as "means an ordered set of data representing coded instructions or statements that when executed by a computer cause the computer to process A group of academic researchers and journalists attempted to reform the second category of cases in the summer of 2016.
138
With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, the researchers filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Attorney General Loretta Lynch, alleging that the CFAA makes violating a terms of service agreement a crime. 139 The plaintiffs in the case claim that they pose online as people of different races to research potential discrimination in hiring and housing practices.
140
By claiming to be people they are not, the plaintiffs are violating the terms of service and could be prosecuted under the CFAA.
141
The complaint points out that even the Justice Department's manual on the CFAA states that "exceeds authorized access" is: [R]elatively easy to prove that a defendant had only limited authority to access a computer in cases where the defendant's access was limited by restrictions that were memorialized in writing, such as terms of service [or] a website notice . . . .
142
Reform efforts are also underway in the third category of cases with the sentencing of Matthew Keys. Keys was a former Reuters employee who gave members of the hacker group "Anonymous" login information for the Tribune Media.
143
Upon obtaining this information, Anonymous altered a headline on a story on the LA Times website, which was live on the Tribune Media website for about forty minutes.
144
Those forty minutes turned into a two-year sentence for Keys, who was convicted of violating the CFAA for giving his information to Anonymous. 145 Again, Keys did not post the headline himself, but merely shared his login information.
146
The eight-word headline allegedly cost Tribune Media $929,977 in defacement.
147
When convicted, Keys tweeted out, "That was bullsh**." First, an action under the CFAA must be tied to an independent wrongful action; for example, trade secret misappropriation. 158 Second, that wrongful action would need to be tied to exceeding authorized access. Id.
158
159
Id. Risch put it best when he wrote: "In other words, lying about your age shouldn't affect access rights generally, but lying about your age might very well be a problem if the reason you did so was to prey on young children." Id.
Another suggestion would be to reject both of the circuits analyses and instead akin authorization to a physical trespass with similar elements.
160
This would require a prosecutor or a plaintiff to prove three elements to be successful: (1) access violating an express or implied prohibition; (2) the alleged violator knew or should have known about the prohibition; (3) and, the prohibition would be "material or related to the underlying policy of trespass." 161 The second element breaks down into three subcategories to prove knowledge of the prohibition: a code-based approach, a notification approach, and a social norm approach.
162
A codebased approach, like a password, would be required if the computer's owner had some sort of program to stop access and the user knew they were exceeding their authorization. 163 Another approach could be a notification that certain access is unauthorized, like a disclaimer or a terms of service post. 164 The last type of knowledge to show a user knew or should have known they violated their terms of access would be a social norm approach. 165 An example would be a hacker continuously accessing a website with a program that shuts down the website's server. 166 While the hacker was authorized to visit the site, social norms would suggest the hacker was not authorized to visit the site in such an aggressive manner to shut the site down.
167
There are inherent problems with this physical trespass approach. While a code-based approach to understanding whether or not the user should have known their access exceeded authorization would seem to be a simple solution, consider the following scenario from Michael L. Levy, the Chief of Computer Crimes for the United States Attorney's office in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
168
One employee asks another to login to his computer at work while he is away so she can relay some information. 169 From a code-based approach, the second employee would not know or have reason to know that they had exceeded authorized access. Id. at 1483. 162 Id. at 1487-94. 163 Id. at 1487. 164 Id. at 1490. 165 Id. at 1493. This approach suggests the user would know their access was prohibited because "social norms, or conventions, with which the defendant was familiar, demand the conclusion." Id.
166
Goldfoot & Bamzai supra note 160, at 1493. 167 Id.
168
Levy, supra note 129, at 1603. 169 Id.
170
Id.
Another approach to fixing the problems with the CFAA includes amending the language, like that of Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and Senator Lindsey Graham's July 2015 proposal.
182
The amendment would replace the language of the CFAA to "intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization and thereby obtain[ing] information from or caus [ing] damage to any such protected computer." 183 However, the proposed amendment uses "protected computer," and calls for the same definition currently in the CFAA.
184
That definition is narrow and would only protect government computers or those used for interstate or foreign commerce. 185 For example, unless an employer is the United States government, a financial institution, or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, the amendment does not cover a situation in which someone stole information from their employer.
186
While the phrase interstate commerce could be stretched to almost any situation, without a more clear definition of the type of information this amendment would protect, this amendment leaves the CFAA weaker, rather than stronger than before.
IV. CLICK HERE TO AGREE: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CFAA CRISIS
In order to fix the CFAA to provide a more uniform approach, the Supreme Court could grant certiorari and give courts a uniform interpretation, or Congress could pass an amendment to the CFAA, providing better definitions and context on how the CFAA should be used.
A. System Override: The Supreme Court Option
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Nosal v. United States to answer the question concerning whether the CFAA should be 182 Levy, supra note 129, at 1607. 183 Id. The rest of the amendment reads: "(B) accesses a protected computer with authorization and thereby knowingly obtains information from such computer that the accessor is not entitled to obtain, or knowingly obtains any information from such computer for a purpose that the accessor knows is prohibited by the computer owner, if -(i) the value of the information obtained exceeds [$ 10,000]; (ii) [the conduct was undertaken in furtherance of any felony violation of the laws of the United States or of any State, unless an element of such violation would require proof that the information was obtained without authorization or in excess of authorization;] or (iii) the protected computer is owned or operated by or on behalf of a State or local governmental entity responsible for the administration of justice, public health, or safety, or of the United States Government; and (C) the limitation on access to or use of the information is not based solely on the terms of a contractual obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, between a provider of online service and a customer or subscriber thereof." Id. heart of the CFAA. By following this analysis, a court would almost always come down in favor of the government or a company. While this may seem harsh, the purpose of the CFAA is clear.
198
Congress intended to protect data and, in a digital age, there can be no loopholes.
B. Rewiring the CFAA: A Suggested New Approach
If the Supreme Court does not eventually grant certiorari and Congress instead decides to amend the CFAA, there are three major considerations. First, Congress should emphasize data rather than computers in any amendment. Second, Congress should seek to fully define all aspects of an amendment, creating one interpretation of the law for courts to follow. Finally, Congress should consider bifurcating the civil and criminal aspects of any amendment.
First, Congress should amend the CFAA in title and scope to focus on what they are actually trying to protect: data. The CFAA is not truly concerned with the desktop or laptop computer on every employee's desk. 199 Nor is the CFAA aimed at the cellphone in the pocket of almost every American with a smartphone.
200
The CFAA is aimed at protecting data. 201 This slight tweak covers the information stored electronically and is a better descriptor at the root of the litigation. If an employee were to walk out of the office with the intent to steal their work computer, it would be theft. If the employee were to take the information from the computer, they are only stealing the data. This data is the root of the three categories of cases involving the CFAA. Hackers do not hack computers to steal equipment; they do so to steal data. One potential definition of data comes from Texas' version of the CFAA.
202
While not the most updated version, this definition does encompass the purpose of the law rather than computer.
"Data" means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions that is being prepared or has been prepared in a formalized manner and is intended to be stored or processed, is being stored or processed, or has been stored or processed in a computer. Data may be embodied in any form, including but not limited to computer 
